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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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The author’s previous research surveyed issues and policies related to the trend toward 
increased reliance on contractors in combat and other contingency operations, documented 
relevant case studies, and, presented analyses and recommendations.1 The current research 
presents a background summary and updates relevant policy developments since the earlier 
research. It then takes a distinctly different approach than the earlier study. Instead of trying to 
extract additional lessons from case studies of current events, this research attempts to gain 
historical perspective through case studies of earlier conflicts, primarily World War II. Rather 
than attempting to survey a catalog of issues, this research concentrates on a narrow set of 
issues.  
The issues reviewed in this paper relate to the extent contractors can and should be 
made an integral part of the “mission team” in combat and contingency operations. If contractors 
have become integral to the success of combat and contingency operations, shouldn’t they be 
responsive and responsible to the commander formally charged with mission success? 
Expressed another way, can and should the concept of “unity of command” be applied to 
contractors in a combat theater? Assuming that contractors should be integrated into joint task 
force operations in a way that creates the essence of unity of command, how can that be 
accomplished?  
                                                
1 Dunn, Contractors in the 21st Century ‘Combat Zone’, presented at the Naval Post Graduate School 2nd 
Annual Acquisition Research Conference (vide). Available from the Center for Public Policy and Private 
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The question of contractor control/unity of command can be relatively simply stated as 
suggested in the previous paragraph. This research found, however, that the path toward 
combatant commander control of contractors is complicated by divergent policies, conflicting 
belief systems, disconnections between policy theory and “on the ground” reality, and a variety 
of legal and regulatory hurdles. 
A key aspect of the commander’s ability to control the forces in his theater, uniformed 
military or civilian contractor, is the ability to direct available forces to perform the most critical 
tasks when necessary. In a combat zone, the performance of critical tasks may involve activities 
that constitute or approach “direct participation” in combat. This is not an issue for uniformed 
military personnel; every soldier can be made a rifleman when necessary. However, civilians 
who directly participate in combat risk becoming illegal combatants under international law, 
compromise their potential status as prisoners of war, and potentially become subject to criminal 
sanctions. Civilian contractors may find themselves participating directly in combat because 
their contract work calls for such action (e.g., certain weapons system or security contractors) or 
due to exigent circumstances.  
As pointed out in the author’s earlier work, there are a number of issues concerning 
contractors in combat scenarios that need to be resolved. Policy developments have addressed 
many of these issues in a variety of ways. Progress continues to be made in a number of areas. 
Recent developments have not, however, assured that the theater commander has effective 
control over contractor personnel in his area of responsibility. Current policy purports to prohibit 
direct participation in combat by contractors; but, there seems to be no rigorous method to 
ensure that contractors (either as part of contract work or due to exigent circumstances) do not 
actually participate in combat. Moreover, the concept of “direct participation” is not fixed in 
international law but is still evolving. 
This research aims to examine both these areas and, if possible recommend policies 
and approaches that will assure that the theater commander and his subordinates effectively 
control civilian contractors that support them; and, that only uniformed military personnel will 
actually participate in combat. Both “participation” and “combat” itself may be more amorphous 
in a war on terrorism than in some other conflicts. A corollary to the commander’s control of the 
activities of contractor personnel is the concern that civilian contractors that are exposed to the 
risks of combat receive the same force protection, administrative support, and amenities 
afforded to soldiers under similar circumstances.  
Introduction 
CONTRACT SUPPORT IN COMBAT AND OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS: 
1995-2005 
Pervasiveness and importance of contract support for operational deployments. 
Many recent commentaries on the subject of contract support for combat and other contingency 
operations begin with a brief historical reference that goes something like: “Contractors have 
always been on the battlefield; George Washington’s army relied on civilian wagon drivers.”2 
                                                
2 For example, a comment to that effect was by made David G. Ehrhart, Brig. Gen. (USAF) at the 
American Bar Association Public Contract Law Section’s Federal Procurement Institute held at Annapolis, 
Maryland,March 3, 2006 (hereafter cited as FPI/Annapolis). Some commentators also mention the 
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Comments such as that do not convey the improvements wrought by adoption of the contract 
supply system for the Continental Army nor do they highlight the importance of civilians 
(primarily seamen on privateers) in combat during the Revolutionary War. Washington’s wagon 
drivers and other historical references do, however, suggest questions like, “What is so different 
today?” and, “Don’t we already know how to do this?”   
Actually, things are different today. The international Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) or 
laws of war have evolved through a series of treaties, conventions and protocols over the last 
century. Important elements of international law that affect contract support for combat 
operations continue to evolve. Domestic law, primarily government contract law, has also 
developed significantly in recent decades. More immediately, the end of the Cold War and 
certain business trends since the 1990’s have had major impacts on military force structure and 
the role of contractors supporting the military. 
Victory in the Cold War promised a “peace dividend”, and the Department of Defense 
contributed by reducing its force structure and its proportion of the Federal budget. The defense 
industrial base shrank and consolidated significantly. Simultaneously, deployments of military 
forces in “military operations other than war” as well as combat increased significantly. Then 
came September 11th and the Global War on Terror which promised to require a high operations 
tempo for years to come. 
From a peak of about 2.1 million, the active force shrank to less than 1.4 million by the 
year 2000.3 Despite events since September 11th, 2001, recent military personnel strengths are 
only slightly greater than in 2000, and prospects for large increases are unlikely.4 Given 
shrinking military end-strengths in the 1990’s, a reassessment of force mix was in order. The 
shrinking military opted to emphasize the fighting “tooth” rather than the supporting “tail” in the 
new force mix.5 This decision soon led to the additional measure of providing for necessary 
surge support for military contingencies by contract. The US Army had initiated a policy calling 
for Army components to plan and contract for logistics and engineering services for worldwide 
contingency operations in the mid-1980’s.6 The first actual use of contract support under this 
“Logistics Civil Augmentation Program” (LOGCAP) came in 1989. In the 1990’s, the Navy and 
                                                                                                                                                          
Ferris & Keithly. (2001, September-October). Outsourcing the sinews of war: Contractor logistics, Military 
Review, 72.  
3 DoD’s active duty military personnel strength, fiscal years 1950-2002. Retrieved from 
http://whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/ms8.pgf; at the start of the Iraq war strength was down to 1.3 million.  
4 Bruner. (2004, May 28). Military forces: What is the appropriate size for the United States? 
Congressional Research Service Report. The Bush administration proposed temporary increases in end-
strengths. Actual increases in end-strengths in FY 2005 Defense Authorization Act were limited to 20,000 
for the Army and 3,000 for the Marines (sec. 401, Public Law 108-375).   
5Remarks by Robert St. Onge, Maj. Gen. (USA, ret.). (2005, January 28). George Washington University 
conference: Contractors on the battlefield: Learning from the experience in Iraq (hereafter cited as GWU 
conference). See also Bruner (note 4), ibid. The change is generally ascribed to a decision by Secretary 
Cohen in 1997. 
6 US Army Material Command (AMC). (2003, August). Pamphlet No. 700-300. Logistics civil 





= - 429 - 
=
=
Air Force followed the Army’s lead and entered into worldwide blanket contracts to provide 
certain types of support for contingency operations.7  
A shrinking military and a decision to field more military “tooth” and less “tail” supplies 
only part of the story for the increase in contracted logistics and combat support functions. For 
many years, it has been “the policy of the Government of the United States to rely on 
commercial sources to supply the products and services the government needs. The 
Government shall not start or carry on any activity to provide a commercial product or service if 
the product or service can be procured more economically from a commercial source.”8 In 1966, 
this policy was incorporated in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. This 
policy was honored with varying degrees of support in different Presidential administrations. At 
times, Congress seemed supportive but at other times attempted to block attempts by 
government agencies to “contract out” various functions. Broad trends in the 1990’s, both within 
and outside government, brought “contracting out” or “outsourcing” to the fore.  
Within government, at the same time that military force structure and the procurement 
budget were in decline, the relative importance of DoD service contracting was increasing.9 This 
was part of a government-wide trend.10  
“Contracting out” and “make or buy” decisions are not new business strategies for 
industry. Recent years have seen a change in the nature and tempo of “outsourcing,” however. 
According to some estimates, outsourcing in the United States grew “at an annual compound 
rate in excess of 30 percent” during a five-year period spanning the turn of the Century.11 The 
subjects of outsourcing have also changed. Once it was common to outsource only “tactical” or 
“nonessential” parts of a business, allowing companies to concentrate on “core competencies” 
or the “core business.” A relatively new phenomenon is “strategic outsourcing” where core 
activities like manufacturing or logistics are outsourced. 
It seems safe to assume that outsourcing in the private sector is not a fad but is driven 
by bottom-line considerations. Within government, there is a philosophical basis for outsourcing 
services and products available in the private sector (“a government should not compete against 
its citizens”) but an increase in government outsourcing as well as in “competitive sourcing” (in 
which increased efficiency, whether in- or out-of-house performance results, is the goal) also 
                                                
7 Higgins. (2003, January-February). Civilian augmentation of joint operations. Army Logistician, 35. Text 
contains a description of each service’s program (LOGCAP, AFCAP, and CONCAP). 
8 Bureau of the Budget. (1955, January). Circ. No. 55-4. 
9 Rush. (2003, May). Performance-based service acquisition. Presentation at 2003 Business Managers’ 
Conference. Defense Acquisition University. (By 2001, service contracting was over 50% of DOD’s total 
procurement). According to Robert Lieberman, DoD Assistant Inspector General, between FY1992 and 
FY 1999, DoD services procurement grew from $40 billion to $52 billion (2000, March 16. Testimony. 
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology).  
10 Bruner, ibid, noting that by 2001, services accounted for 60% of total government procurement. 
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has a strong financial motivation.12 The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) has 
estimated that the annual savings from competitive sourcing, if fully implemented, could amount 
to $5 billion.13  
Another factor driving toward increased use of contractors in combat support situations 
is technology. The growing sophistication of DoD systems often requires the expertise of civilian 
contractors to operate and maintain them. One well known example of this was the public 
revelation in 1991 that civilian contractors were aboard J-STARS (Joint Surveillance and Target 
Attack Radar System) aircraft in combat missions during Operation Desert Storm. Civilian 
personnel flew similar missions in the Balkans.  
Civilian contractors have participated in operational missions of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) such as Predator and Global Hawk. They have provided maintenance support 
for tactical aircraft such as the F-117A Nighthawk. System support contractors even appear 
directly on the battlefield when they support systems such as the TOW Improved Target 
Acquisition System. 
In Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-1991, over 500,000 military personnel 
were deployed to the Middle East. The number of civilian employees and contractor personnel 
(about 14,000) deployed seems modest in comparison. That conflict was fought with the Cold 
War force structure still in place. The figures are a bit misleading since they overlook the fact 
that the majority of the transportation (sealift and airlift) that was the means of deployment was 
provided by civilian carriers.14 Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, one of the key points of sealift entry was 
the target of numerous Scud missile attacks—many of which missed ships and port facilities by 
relatively narrow margins.  
In Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, American civilians (primarily contractor 
employees) made up about ten percent of the US force committed. US contractors hired an 
even larger number of Bosnians to perform routine base support services. This was particularly 
important, however, because self-imposed troop ceilings limited the military presence to 20,000 
troops. In counter-drug operations in Columbia, civilians made up about twenty percent of the 
deployed force. Provision of helicopter support by contract in East Timor in 1999 allowed for the 
relief of an amphibious assault ship and entire Marine expeditionary unit. Two such ships and 
units had previously been successively employed to supply helicopter lift in support of the 
Australian-led mission there.15  
The number of contractor personnel supporting the US Army in Iraq and Kuwait under 
LOGCAP is about 25,000. Considering that US military personnel in Iraq generally number less 
than 150,000, this is an impressive figure. This number does not, however, begin to capture the 
                                                
12 “Competitive Sourcing” chapter in Gansler. (2003, June). Moving toward market-based government: 
The changing role of government as provider. IBM Center for the Business of Government. discusses 
competitive sourcing and gives examples of savings. 
13 Safavia, D. Administrator OFPP. (2005, January 25). Letter (no subject) to Richard Cheney, President 
of the Senate. 
14 Matthews & Holt. (1995). So many, So much, So far, So fast. Joint History Office JCS, pp. 37-84,115-
143. 
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contractor presence in Iraq. In addition to LOGCAP, there are numerous other service contracts 
administered by weapons system offices or under authority of the theater commander that have 
a personnel presence in Iraq or Kuwait. Other US Government agencies including the 
Department of State administer significant contract efforts in Iraq. Suffice to say that many 
billions of dollars of contracted work and thousands of contractor personnel are part of US 
efforts to establish a peaceful Iraq that will not harbor terrorists, but will contribute to regional 
stability and world peace. 
What functions do deployed contractors perform? The General Accountability Office 
(GAO) prepared a list of contractor provided services in different deployment locations as part of 
one of its reviews of issues related to contract combat support.16 One category is base 
operations support. This includes many mundane tasks once performed by soldiers of a 
different era (peeling potatoes, cleaning latrines), occasionally power generation, and, a variety 
of maintenance and “quality of life” support activities. Fuel and material transport were 
performed by contractors in all deployed locations surveyed by GAO. Management and control 
of government property was another function performed by contractors in all locations surveyed. 
Other functions were performed in some deployed locations but not in others. These 
included logistics support, pre-positioned equipment maintenance, non-tactical communications, 
biological/chemical detection systems, continuing education, tactical and non-tactical vehicle 
maintenance, medical service, and, mail service. 
Other services provided by contractors in the GAO list seem much more closely aligned 
with combat activities. These include weapons systems support, intelligence analysis, linguists, 
C4-I, and, security guards. These are functions that can obviously be carried out either in the 
United States or at a deployed location. When they are carried out in a deployed location in 
conjunction with military operations, some of these activities seem to have the potential to 
involve contractor employees in something akin to direct participation in combat. 
The preceding list includes security guards. These are guards contracted primarily to 
provide physical security to DoD installations and personnel. Contract security guards are 
common at both CONUS and overseas DoD facilities. They may be entry or perimeter guards or 
provide special security to high-value facilities. They are often authorized to carry side arms and 
sometimes have access to more substantial weapons. In the event of an assault on a DoD 
installation, they would undoubtedly attempt to repel the attack. In a war zone, the fact that their 
actions were defensive in nature would not exempt their activities from constituting direct 
participation in combat. 
Not necessarily included within the GAO list are other security personnel. Consistent 
with DoD policy, many contracts require contractors to provide their own security or “force 
protection.” Contractors often do this by subcontracting with private security companies who 
typically employ highly trained professionals, often former US Special Forces/SEAL personnel 
or experienced foreign nationals. The former head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) 
in Iraq, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, entrusted his security to such firms including Blackwater 
Security.  
                                                
16 GAO. (2003, June). Contractors provide vital services to deployed forces but are not adequately 
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Whether under direct contract to a government agency or under a subcontract to a 
combat support contractor, private security firms have a strong presence in Iraq. By all 
accounts, in the narrow sense, they have done their job well. Some have questioned, however, 
whether their presence has had more negative rather than positive impact on the Coalition’s 
overall goals in Iraq.17 Private security firms have been involved in clashes with both insurgents 
and US military forces. The most famous incident occurred on 4 April 2004 in Najaf. A small 
number of highly experienced Blackwater employees and a couple military personnel held off a 
large number of attacking insurgents and reportedly inflicted numerous casualties. During this 
operation, the small team of Americans received air support. Helicopters operated by 
Blackwater pilots delivered ammunition to them while the engagement was still in progress. 
Whether cleaning latrines, delivering fuel and ammunition, interrogating prisoners, 
supporting operational planning, operating UAVs, supporting weapons systems in the field, or, 
fighting pitched gun battles, contractors are not only present in current US military operations, 
but provide vitally needed manpower and resources. Absent an unlikely substantial growth and 
realignment (and return to the draft) of the US military, contractor support for military operations 
seems destined to continue into the foreseeable future. Contract support is a vital element in the 
projection of US military power. The question is not whether contractors should have such a 
vital presence in the operational deployments of US forces. The last decade has resolved that 
question. The key questions are how best to utilize and manage contract support in combat and 
contingency deployments.  
Perceived weakness and inconsistency in DOD policy and management of 
“contractors accompanying the force.” The author’s previous research highlighted a number 
of deficiencies or “contracting challenges” related to using support contractors in combat and 
other contingency operations. Two of these were particularly emphasized. They were (1) the 
need for training and (2) the need to enhance the contracting authority of the theater and joint 
task force commander. The current research reinforces those earlier perceptions. However, 
both areas (and particularly training) are complicated by an over-riding condition, namely, 
contracting policy often does not fit the reality of the combat zone. 
The discussion of training noted that while: 
the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib may have been unique, the evident lack of 
 understanding about proper relationships and roles for contractors may not be equally 
 unique. Many soldiers at Abu Ghraib thought contractors were supposed to be fully 
 integrated in the chain of command and even assume supervisory roles over military 
 personnel. This view was shared by the OIC of investigations at the prison and even 
 articulated by a field grade Army spokesman who made comments about the situation 
 from the Pentagon.18  
                                                
17 Remarks of Thomas Hammes, Col. (USMC) at GWU conference (note 5). Hammes recounted 
Blackwater black SUVs racing through the streets of Baghdad running his own military vehicle as well as 
Iraqi civilian vehicles off the road on more than one occasion. This annoyed (Hammes used a Marine 
euphemism) many Iraqis in the process and, no doubt, contributed to an unwanted “ugly American” 
image.  
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The discussion continued: “Support service contracts are hard to manage. Maintaining a 
team concept between contractor employees and government personnel that work side by side 
in an office or on the battlefield is important. Maintaining formal distinctions between the two is 
also required (primarily because personal service contracts are generally not authorized).”19 
The “proper roles” and “formal distinctions” mentioned in the previous quotations are 
those that stem from government contract law and regulations.20 The “team” concept and “chain 
of command” are personnel management concepts; ones that are particularly important to the 
military. In addition to revealing a deficiency in training, the quotations above may illustrate a 
divergence between contracting regulations and the imperatives of effectively handling 
personnel and fighting a war.  
Contract vehicles available to support the mission of the combatant commander include 
external support contracts, systems support contracts, and, theater support contracts. These 
terms have all been described and examples given in the author’s earlier work.21 Systems 
support involves the operation or maintenance of weapons, surveillance, targeting or 
intelligence systems which are involved in deployed contingency operations. External support is 
exemplified by LOGCAP; contracts are awarded and administered by a command other than the 
theater commander but are intended to provide logistics and other support to the theater 
commander. Theater support contracts may provide many of the same supplies and services as 
external support contracts but are under cognizance of the theater commander. All three types 
of contracting may be referred to as “contingency contracting”; but more narrowly, that term 
applies to relatively small purchases often in local currency conducted with a minimum of 
formality but with an understanding of local business customs and satisfying the immediate 
needs of the troops being supported. 
Of the three kinds of combat support contractors mentioned above, only the theater 
support contractor operates in an environment where lines of contract authority, resource 
allocation, and the chain of command intersect. Even then, the chain of command and lines of 
contract authority may not be identical. For other types of contractors (external support and 
weapons systems contractors) contract authority, resource allocation, and the customer often 
constitute three different chains of command. In Iraq, this situation was complicated by the 
presence of other government agencies and their contractors, as well as contractors of the 
CPA. The combatant commander is responsible for the success of his mission, but he may be 
dependent upon large numbers of contractors with whom he has no formal contractual 
relationship but which may have the potential to affect the outcome of his mission.  
The evolution of the Army’s guidance in this area is of interest. The Army’s “Contractors 
on the Battlefield” (Field Manual 3-100-21, 2003, January—previously FM 100-21 of the same 
title) emphasizes planning as the key to obtaining effective support from contractors during 
operations. The Army’s earlier guidance notes that generally “multiple contracting agents” will 
be in the theater dealing with theater support, external support, and systems contractors. The 
                                                
19 Ibid., 61. 
20 The primary procurement law applicable to DoD components is the Armed Services Procurement Act 
(10 USC. chapter 137) implemented by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, FAR, (48 C.F.R. Parts 1-53) 
and the DoD FAR Supplement, DFARS, (48 C.F.R. Parts 201-253). 
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commander is to “integrate and monitor contracting activities throughout the theater.” The 
commander is expressly charged with overall “management and maintaining visibility over the 
total contractor presence in the theater (battlefield) […] contracting support is centralized at the 
highest level to ensure a coordinated approach for operation support.” 
The 2003 revision of the Army guidance seems to recognize that what was previously 
required of the theater commander was simply impossible under existing management 
techniques and policies. Under the revised manual, the commander merely “sets the tone for 
the use of contractor support” through the planning process. He is to assure “harmony of effort.” 
The commander’s principal assistant for contracting (PARC) is responsible only for theater 
support contracts. This guidance is tantamount to admitting that the theater commander directs 
contractors through coordination and persuasion rather than command. 
Unity of command is one of the principles of war recognized in the US Army Principles of 
War (1993). According to the military maxims of Napoleon, “Nothing is so important in war as an 
undivided command” (Military Maxim LXIV)—sometimes translated, “Nothing is more important 
in war than unity in command.”  
In some recent operational deployments, support contractors have made up twenty 
percent or more of the deployed force. In the case of some specialties, contractors are on scene 
to operate and maintain key systems that could not operate, or operate as well, without their 
help. They certainly provide essential logistics support in most operational deployments. 
Contractors are not merely important but vital to the success of most operational deployments.22 
Contractors are important to military success. Unity of command is an important principle 
of war. We don’t have unity of command with respect to contract combat support. This sounds 
like a recipe for disaster. No documented disaster has yet happened. How do we account for 
this anomaly? One hypothesis might be that unity of command is not actually important in this 
context. Another hypothesis might be that some condition mitigates the lack of unity of 
command or effectively substitutes for it. 
Army policy is clearly stated in “Contractors Accompanying the Force” (Army Regulation 
715-9): “contractor employees are not under the direct supervision of military personnel in the 
chain of command.” This is, of course, consistent with general principles of government contract 
law that recognize an employee-employer relationship between contractor employees and the 
contractor but not between contractor employees and the government. Moreover, the 
contractual relationship between the contractor and the government (so far as direction and 
control are concerned) is between the contractor and an authorized contracting officer; not the 
“customer” or beneficiary of the services the contractor provides. In the case of deployed 
contractors, the cognizant contracting officer might be somewhere in the same theater, but more 
probably is in another country or on another continent. 
The policy is clear; yet, in the Abu Ghraib example, soldiers (including officers) thought 
contractors were in the chain of command. The same belief was held by a US Army spokesman 
in Washington who stated civilian contractors at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere “fall in line with the 
                                                
22 Love, M. K. Remarks at FPI/Annapolis (contractors provide “vital” combat support); comments 
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current command structure” and are treated just like regular Army personnel.23 A spokesman for 
the contractor involved made a somewhat similar statement: “All CACI employees work under 
the monitoring of the US military chain of command in Iraq.”24  
There is evidence that beliefs about how contractor employees should relate to the chain 
of command are not limited to the examples cited above.25 Lockheed-Martin weapons system 
support contractor “employees took nearly all their direction from the field commander.”26 
Government officials have admitted that what’s in writing and the way things actually happen 
may be different; contracting officers may not be directly in control.27 “Command and control is 
more important.”28 
An official for a firm that provided security for officials of the former CPA has stated that 
things go on daily “outside the scope of the contract. Reality meets the terms of the contract, 
and they don’t match.”29 His company would “provide a flexible solution.” He emphasized the 
give-and-take needed to make the contract work, stating that it was “not a used car deal”! 
Some companies (represented in the Professional Services Council or PSC) operating in 
Iraq do operate through established lines of contract authority. They found that deployed 
“contracting officials often lacked authority that was retained by PCOs [procurement contracting 
officer] and ACOs [administrative contracting officer] in the United States. Contractors found that 
the terms and conditions of their contracts often dealt inconsistently or erroneously with worker 
and work place security requirements. The change-order process was slow due to lack of local 
ACO authority and distances involved. Companies often received conflicting and contradictory 
directions from their local customer and COR/CO.”30 
A report by PSC companies found “application of FAR requirements involved significant 
limits and costs that were not always understood particularly by the oversight community.”31 
There was a lack of authority to waive socio-economic clauses that made no sense under the 
circumstances. The prevalence of undefinitized contractual actions and Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) insistence on immediate audits caused significant problems. The requirements 
                                                
23 Worden. (2004, June 15). Army may be misusing contractors. The-Signal.com (quoting Lt. Col. Pamela 
Hart) 
24 Ibid. 
25 Davidson. (2000). Ruck up: An Introduction to legal issues associated with civilian contractors on the 
battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233 at 266-267. 
26 Colby, D. C. (2006, April 12).  Lockheed-Martin Orlando, remarks at FPI/Annapolis. Original statement 
did not include “nearly,” which was added per e-mail correction from Colby.  
27 Ehrhart (note 2), ibid. agreeing with Colby, ibid. 
28 Bachman, M. Assoc. General Counsel, Department of the Air Force. Remarks at FPI/Annapolis.  
29 Taylor, C. Vice-President, Blackwater USA. Remarks at GWU conference (note 5).  
30 Dunn (note 1) op. cit., 41 summarizing parts of a briefing prepared by representatives of the 
Professional Services Council. 
31 Ibid., p.40; See also Testimony of Soloway, S. (2005, June 32). President, Professional Services 
Council, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee 
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definition process was too decentralized and often disconnected from the contracting and 
contract administration process. Performance requirements and execution times were often 
unrealistic and not synchronized with the government’s ability to support contractor 
deployments. The “customer” was not always closely connected to contract execution and 
established contract roles and responsibilities. 
As indicated earlier in this section, some contractors dealt with the disconnection 
between the “customer” (military in the field) and the established contract lines of authority by 
following directions from the commander in the field rather than seeking direction from the 
contracting officer. This practice would seem to risk “constructive changes” in contract work, out 
of scope performance, and other actions resulting in requests for equitable adjustments in price, 
claims, disputes and litigation. Available evidence suggests that no unusual amount of litigation 
is associated with Iraq or other contingency contracting. In the case of the Lockheed-Martin 
weapons systems support contracts mentioned above, there have been no claims for equitable 
adjustment.32 Some of these were time and materials (T&M) contracts for which the contractor 
was reimbursed for expenses actually incurred, but some were fixed-price. In other cases, 
“ratification [after the fact approval] was commonly used.”33 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is not unreasonable to conclude that there has 
been no crisis from the lack of “contract unity of command” because in fact many contractors 
are following directions of the local command and acting as if they were subject to the chain of 
command. This may be because they believe they are subject to the chain of command or 
merely because it makes good sense. In other cases, contracting officers are in the theater and 
available to make timely decisions coordinated with the local military command.34 
When contractors act as if they are subject to the local chain of command and take their 
directions accordingly, it does not seem to result in disputes and litigation. This probably stems 
from the fact that many absentee contracting officers realize they are in no position to give 
timely or intelligent direction to contractors deployed at a distant and dangerous location. By 
approving billings for T&M contracts without undue scrutiny or ratifying “unauthorized” 
contractual actions, contracting officers are endorsing “on the ground” decisions that they are 
not really in a position to second-guess. 
The immediately preceding paragraphs are not meant to imply that the traditional 
contract lines of authority and contracting rules never work for deployed combat support 
contracts. Considering that both contractors and government personnel have been steeped in 
traditional rules for decades, they must sometimes have been made to work in ways 
approximating normal efficiency. The fact that there are documented reports of disconnects, 
inefficiency, and apparently considerable instances of ignoring contracting lines of authority, 
                                                
32 Colby (2006, April 12). Remarks (note 26), ibid. Following sentence modified to include “fixed price.”  
33 Nibley, S. (2006, February 24).  Emergency contracting at home and in battle. Presentation at West 
Government Contracts Year in Review Conference, Washington, DC (hereafter cited as West 
conference). See FAR 1.602-3 for ratification policy and procedure.  
34 The mere presence of contracting officers in a theater does not guarantee timely decisions. In Iraq, at 
one point contract oversight personnel outnumbered warranted contracting officers. Some contracting 
officers were so intimidated and afraid to make a wrong decision that they made no decisions at all. 
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tends to strongly suggest that a preference for contracting rules over military principles may be 
misguided.  
It is hardly comforting to say, “But see, contracting officers do approve out of scope T&M 
billings and do ratify unauthorized actions; the system does work.” If the DoD intends to operate 
consistent with policy, out-of-scope T&M billings should not be approved, and ratifications 
should be rare rather than “routine” and certainly not handled in a way that “encourages such 
commitments” (FAR 1.602-3 (1)). Strict enforcement of contracting rules might well bring about 
the crisis flowing from a lack of unity of command that has not yet been apparent. If contracting 
rules and policies cannot be strictly applied without threatening important military principles, 
perhaps they need to be seriously reconsidered.  
The author’s own recommendations for enhancing the combatant commander’s 
contracting authority have already been mentioned.35 It is worth noting that in addition to the 
author’s recommendations regarding strengthening the contracting authority of the theater 
commander, others have made somewhat similar, though not identical, recommendations.36 
Additional comments on this will be made in the next section. 
Some contractor personnel may believe they are subject to the military chain of 
command. Others may act as if they were subject to the military chain of command. This may 
mask inadequacies in combat support contracting policy. It does not, however, meet the 
requirements of international law should contractor personnel participate directly in combat.  
Contractor personnel are deployed to zones of conflict to operate and maintain 
sophisticated weapons systems. Others are sent as security guards either to protect 
government assets or as “force protection” for contractors performing other functions. Others 
who are contracted to perform only mundane tasks are authorized to carry side arms. These 
and other categories of contractor personnel may, and have, directly participated in combat. The 
implications of this flow not only to the individuals involved but to the United States as party to 
international agreements and LOAC generally, the theater commander, and the companies of 
the employees involved. 
The combination of armed contractors engaging in hostilities, (either pursuant to, or 
contrary to, authoritative direction) and a military commander in charge of an operational area 
but not in direct control of contractor personnel has grave implications. LOAC presupposes that 
violations of the laws of war will be avoided through the control of military commanders that are 
responsible for their subordinates. When members of a military force violate the laws of war and 
their theater commander is charged with their crimes, it is no defense for the commander to 
assert he did not have actual control of his troops.37 It is not hard to envisage this principle being 
extended to the control of contractors that are being utilized as a substitute for, or to augment, a 
deployed military force.  
                                                
35 Note 1, op. cit., pp. 63-67, 75-77. 
36 Douglas. (2004). Contractors accompanying the force: Empowering commanders with emergency 
change authority. 31 A.F.L.R. 127; American Bar Association. (2005, October 12). Contractors in the 
battle space. Section on Public Contract Law. (Report and letter to Principal Deputy to the Assistant 
Secretary of the Army); DoD proposed rule (2004, 23 March). Contractor personnel supporting a force 
deployed outside the United States. 69 F.R. 13,500.  
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The United States of America may be tarred internationally by the actions of contractors 
it has sent to a combat zone. A theater commander and his subordinates may be held criminally 
liable for the actions of contractor personnel in their area of responsibility.38 Companies face 
civil or criminal jeopardy for the acts of their employees.39 One person most unlikely to be 
subject to criminal sanctions for contractor misconduct is the contracting officer! 
Given the implications of inadequate theater combat commander control over 
contractors and the risks associated with contractors participating in hostilities, one might 
predict that these issues would be of paramount concern for policy makers. Since operational 
deployments involve war or, at least a threat of hostile action, one would assume that military 
principles, such as unity of command, would strongly inform policy developments concerning 
operational deployments, which would in turn guide the formation of contracting policy to 
support such deployments. The next section shows this has not been the case. 
Recent policy developments and management initiatives. In 2003, the General 
Accountability Office (GAO) found that there was no DoD-wide guidance on the subject of 
contractors deploying overseas with military forces and that DoD “has not fully included 
contractor support in its operational and strategic plans.”40 Lack of DoD-wide policy was 
remedied in 2005. Surprisingly, DoD policy was promulgated not in a DoD Directive but in 
changes to the DFARS.41 Subsequently, a DoD Instruction (“Contractor Personnel Authorized to 
Accompany the US Armed Forces”, DODI 3020.41, 3 Oct. 2005) was issued requiring use of 
“contractor support…consistent with the” DFARS. Thus DFARS constitutes top level DoD policy 
for areas within its coverage. The DODI coverage overlaps the DFARS to a considerable extent 
and also covers areas not addressed by the DFARS. 
The DFARS prescribes a contract clause (Antiterrorism/Force Protection Policy for 
Defense Contractors Outside the United States, DFARS 252.225-7040) for inclusion in 
contracts to be performed outside the United States. Certain provisions of this clause address 
some of the issues discussed in the previous section. 
The clause requires contractors to understand that contract performance in support of 
forces deployed outside the US may require work in dangerous or austere conditions, and the 
contractor accepts the risks associated with the required contract performance. Another 
provision states that contractor personnel are not combatants, such personnel shall not 
undertake any role that would jeopardize their status, and the contractor employees shall not 
use force or otherwise directly participate in acts likely to cause actual harm to enemy armed 
forces. 
                                                
38 Ibid. (see comments in preceding paragraph). Military personnel up to the rank of Brigadier General 
were disciplined for misconduct at Abu Ghraib, some of which involved indirect responsibility for actions of 
military subordinates and contractor personnel. 
39 For example, Nordan v. Blackwater (No. 5:05-CV-48-FL(1), USD.C., E.D.N.C.) wrongful death action 
filed against Blackwater Security arising out of incidents at Fallujah, Iraq, in 2004.  
40 GAO (note 16), pp. 2-3, 15-20.  
41 Changes to DFARS Parts 207, 212, 225, and 252; Contractor personnel supporting a force deployed 
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The clause requires contractors to comply with and ensure that its personnel are familiar 
with and comply with all applicable US, host country, and third country national laws, treaties 
and international agreements, US regulations, directions, instructions, policies and procedures, 
and orders and directives and instructions issued by the combatant commander relating to force 
protection, security, health, safety, or relations or interactions with local nationals. 
The most interesting part of the DFARS changes is what they do not contain. As 
originally proposed (69 Federal Register 13500) language would have vested in combatant 
commanders authority to order emergency changes in contract performance. This provision was 
deleted from the final version of the rule. Some comments received in the rule-making process 
raised concerns about the language. DoD reversed its original position and stated the “proposed 
language is not consistent with existing procurement law and policy.” Other comments received 
during the rule-making process supported the recommended change and even suggested 
clarifying or expanding the proposed authority of the combatant commander as well as vesting 
subordinate commanders with similar authority. The DoD response nonconcurring with these 
comments stated “DoD does not recommend any revisions or expansions to the authorities of 
the combatant commander” (emphasis added). 
The DoD does not recommend any revisions or expansions to the authorities of the 
combatant commander. For all the many pages of fine print in the DFARS changes and DoD 
Instruction, that is the bottom line. The DoD recommends no changes that will enhance unity of 
command nor increase the combatant commander’s control over contractors supporting his 
operations. New contract language that talks about contractors complying with orders and 
directions of the combatant commander is not, in fact, intended to expand the commander’s 
authority. 
Language in the new contract clause that talks about contractors not being combatants 
or harming enemy forces may actually contain less substance than first meets the eye. The 
clause specifically states: “Contractor personnel are not combatants and shall not take any role 
that would jeopardize their status. Contractor personnel shall not use force or otherwise directly 
participate in acts likely to cause actual harm to enemy forces” (DFARS 252.225-7040 (b) (3)). 
Neither the words used nor their context makes these provisions applicable to the contractor. 
They are directed toward and applicable, by their express terms, to “contractor personnel” who 
“shall not…” The government has no privity of contract with employees of the contractor. The 
words are not applicable to the contractor and, since the government has no direct relationship 
to the contractor’s employees, the quoted language is of questionable legal effect at best.   
It is probably not too harsh a judgment to say that recent DoD policy fails to enhance the 
contracting authority of the combatant commander or contribute to unity of command in the 
least. To the extent recent policy embodied in the new contract clause attempts to address the 
issue of contractor personnel participating directly in combat, it does so in an inept and 
ineffective way. 
Various provisions of the DFARS and DODI address the subject of “direct participation” 
by contractor personnel and sometimes seem to conflict. The DODI expressly permits their 
“indirect participation in military operations” and additionally notes their “inherent right to self 
defense” (DODI 3020.41, para. 6.1.1). The DFARS does not prohibit contractor personnel from 
being armed either pursuant to contract or with privately-owned weapons. The discussion of the 
final rule states the combatant commander will be involved in issues regarding arming 
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contractor is “to ensure that its personnel who are authorized to carry weapons are adequately 
trained. That should include training not only on how to use a weapon, but when to use a 
weapon” (70 Federal Register 23797). The DFARS states contractor personnel “shall not use 
force.” The DODI says contractor personnel are “authorized to use force” for self-defense (para. 
6.3.4.1). The DODI also expressly permits security services to be provided by armed contractor 
personnel (para. 6.3.5). In the case of ongoing or imminent combat operations, such services 
are to be used “cautiously” (6.3.5.2). 
“Indirect” participation in combat operations allowed by the DODI includes “transporting 
munitions and other supplies, performing maintenance functions for military equipment, 
providing security services” (6.1.1); and, as already suggested, there is no restriction from the 
performance of these functions when combat is “ongoing or imminent.” Recent experience has 
shown that when contractors perform these functions under battlefield conditions, they are likely 
to be involved in combat. This entitles them to engage in their “inherent right” to self-defense. 
Neither the DFARS nor DODI attempts to expressly deal with hard questions concerning 
“direct participation” that have actually occurred. These include civilians flying combat missions 
on J-STARS, civilians operating UAVs, repairing weapons under combat conditions, civilian 
interpreters accompanying military forces in combat operations, or contractors flying on board 
aircraft involved in re-supply missions in defended areas. Circumstances constituting “indirect 
participation,” other than a very few examples given, are left to case-by-case analysis. 
Moreover, the examples given may, as suggested in the previous paragraph, involve 
contractors in combat situations. Although both documents require compliance with treaties and 
international agreements, neither document warns contractors that the concept of “direct 
participation” is currently in a state of evolution in international law.42 
It would be wrong to leave the impression that either the DFARS or DODI were solely or 
even primarily concerned with the issues that are the subject of this paper. In both documents, 
there is evidence that considerable time, thought and effort was devoted to a variety of issues 
that affect contingency contracting and the role of contractors supporting a deployed force. 
Some of the issues might be characterized as “house keeping” type issues, but that is not to say 
there are not quite important on the practical level. Despite the effort devoted to crafting 
appropriate DoD policies for contractors supporting military deployments, there are still many 
unresolved issues. A brief review of some of those issues is included in the next section.  
Unresolved issues. The original title contemplated for this paper was “Contractors on 
the Battlefield: Who is in charge?” In dealing with unresolved issues, before getting down to 
focusing on issues specific to contracting, perhaps we should inquire, “Defense logistics: Who is 
in charge, the military department or the combatant commander?” It seems worthwhile to 
explore the question at least briefly since the obvious dispersion of contracting authority in and 
out of the area of responsibility and the apparent reticence of DoD to vest the combatant 
                                                
42 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which has a key role in overseeing the Geneva 
Conventions and the development of international humanitarian law has sponsored conferences 
(Geneva, 2003 and The Hague, 2005) on “Direct Participation in Hostilities” and plans additional 
conferences. Scholarly writing in this area is increasing. For example see, Schmitt, “Humanitarian Law 
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commander with enhanced contracting authority may, in part, rest on a fundamental tension 
between the authority of military departments (services) and the combatant commanders. 
The Secretaries of the Military Departments (specifically the Secretary of the Army in this 
case) have the following authority: 
Subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to 
 the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and 
 has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, 
 including the following functions:  *** 
  (3) Supplying. 
  (6) Servicing. 
  (10) Maintaining. 
  (11) The constructing, outfitting, and repair of military equipment. 
  (12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of [real property assets]. (10 USC 3013) 
This statutory charter and additional authorities give the Service Secretaries broad 
discretion in areas involved in or impacting logistics. However, the authority contains a proviso, 
namely, that it is “subject to chapter 6 of this title.”  
The chapter 6 in question deals with combatant commands. Section 165 of chapter 6 
expressly states each Service Secretary “is responsible for the administration and support of 
forces assigned by him to a combatant command.” This responsibility is subject to the authority 
of the Secretary of Defense and “subject to the authority of commanders of combatant 
commands under section 164 (c) of this title.” 
Section 164 (c) gives combatant commanders, subject only to the authority of the 
President and Secretary of Defense, functions that include:  
(A) giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces to carry out 
 missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of 
 military operations, joint training, and logistics; (B) prescribing the chain of command to 
 the commands and forces within the command; (F) coordinating or approving those 
 aspects of administration and support (including control of resources and equipment, 
 internal organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out the missions 
 assigned to the command. 
The statutory authority delineated above would seem to give combatant commanders clear 
authority “over all aspects […] of logistics” and “control of resources and equipment […] 
necessary to carry out the missions assigned.” A complete treatment of this subject is beyond 
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unfettered authority over logistics suggested by the quoted statutory language.43 According to 
one commentator, there is a lack of integration that:  
 results in service program offices, material commands, and inventory control points 
 writing logistics support contracts independently, without considering how to integrate 
 logistics support in the theater of operations and how to handle the ensuing 
 management challenges facing the combatant commander. The presence of contractor 
 personnel in the theater may place the responsibility for their force protection, clothing, 
 housing, medical care, and transportation on the combatant commander, but he lacks 
 the overarching doctrine needed to address the multitude of issues that result from the 
 presence of contractors.44  
A number of issues, some of which were addressed in the author’s earlier research, 
continue to impact “battlefield” and other contingency contracting. The issues below will be dealt 
with only briefly, since most have been examined in the author’s earlier paper or discussed 
above.  
Contracting in Iraq has been the subject of exaggerated and irresponsible claims 
approaching demagogy by politicians. Repeated charges have been levied against “Halliburton” 
(actually, Halliburton subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root, KBR). Halliburton’s former CEO (Vice 
President Cheney) has apparently made it a convenient whipping boy. Rep. Henry Waxman (D 
– Calif.) has been among the chief accusers. A pattern has developed in which Rep. Waxman 
makes public pronouncements and posts information on his website whenever a review or 
investigation of KBR billings or other action is undertaken, making much of the fact that the 
Army or an audit agency has initiated an investigation. Later, when KBR is cleared or its billings 
substantially approved, Rep. Waxman makes public pronouncements to the effect that the 
“Bush administration” has been soft on its favored contractor. Rep. Waxman has repeatedly 
referred to Halliburton’s no-bid contract, referring to LOGCAP. An official of competing 
contractor Raytheon has publicly pointed out that the contract was “fiercely competed.”45 KBR 
and its employees have been involved in some derelictions under LOGCAP and other contracts, 
but given the immense size of the efforts and conditions involved, this is hardly surprising. 
Inaccurate and inappropriate political commentary contributes to a faulty public perception of 
contingency contracting and affects some of the other issues impacting such contracting. 
Absent a sudden epidemic of honesty among some American politicians, there is little that can 
be done about this, but it does merit a comment as an unresolved issue. 
Flexible contracting vehicles exist to support contingency contracting. Examples of this 
were documented in the author’s previous paper.46 Two commentators recently agreed, 
however, that inflexible contracting vehicles and failure to use flexibilities that exist were among 
the issues common to both Iraq battlefield support and contracting efforts in the wake of 
                                                
43 Paparone. (2005, November-December). Who rules logistics? Service versus COCOM Authority. Army 
Logistician, 37. 
44 McPeak & Ellis. (2004, March-April). Managing contractors in joint operations: Filling the gaps in 
doctrine. Army Logistician, 36. 
45 Michael Mutek, remarks at West Conference (note 33). 
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Hurricane Katrina. One of the commentators stated this was the number one issue in Iraq 
battlefield contracting.47  
The failure to use existing flexibilities may flow from another issue: “Lack of trained 
acquisition personnel and lack of training for contingency contracting.”48 It may also be impacted 
by: “Unreasonable post-award and in some cases post-performance audit; auditing 
contingency/emergency contracting using non contingency/emergency standards.”49 Excessive 
contract oversight and oversight conducted using standards inappropriate for the conditions has 
been documented both in the author’s current and previous research. It is the most likely cause 
of the “fear to make a decision” syndrome among contracting officers which has likewise been 
noted. The fielding of large numbers of on-site contract oversight personnel rather than 
warranted contracting officers seems a serious misallocation of resources.  
Much publicized “abuses” and allegations of “fraud” whether by politicians or in the 
popular press lead “to calls for more oversight and audit scrutiny.”50 “Oversight means second 
guessing”; there is a “need to focus on the front end not the backend,” and we need to get it 
right next time. “Cooperation, if not partnership, is needed to get the job done.”51  
It should be pointed out that Iraq and other deployments are not merely DoD exercises. 
The Department of State and other agencies can be major players. Inter-agency efforts and 
visibility among various agency contractors have not typically been well coordinated. DoD needs 
to get its policy and doctrine in order. That cannot be done in isolation, however. Other agencies 
need to be consulted and, ultimately, a government-wide policy formulated. As exemplified by 
the developments concerning “direct participation in hostilities,” there are international 
dimensions to be considered as well. 
The DFARS change discussed above rejected what was essentially a modest proposal 
to enhance the combatant commander’s contracting authority.52 The rejection was on the basis 
that the change was not consistent with existing procurement law and policy. Even if the stated 
basis was correct, it is interesting to note that there have been no subsequent initiatives to 
modify procurement law and policy to accommodate the kind of change proposed. The 
procurement status quo was apparently judged more important than the needs of troops and 
contractor personnel on the battlefield. 
The success of our nation’s enterprise in Iraq depends largely on our military presence. 
Contractors provide a vital part of our military presence. The willingness of contractors and their 
employees to go to Iraq (and other dangerous places) is based on a mix of profit and 
                                                
47 Nibley & Mutek. Emergency contracting at home and in battle. Conference Briefs, 14, from West 
Conference (note 32). Michael Mutek identified lack of contracting flexibility as the prime issue in his 
remarks.  
48 Conference Briefs, ibid. Stuart Nibley identified this as his prime issue. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Remarks by Nibley, S. & Mutek, M. West Conference (note 32). 
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patriotism.53 In Iraq, contractor employees “live like soldiers;” and in the case of some 
Lockheed-Martin employees; were under mortar fire for 180 consecutive days.54 Contractor 
employees have suffered considerable casualties—including nearly three hundred deaths by 
one count.55 Contractor employees generally consider themselves as part of the “team” and try 
to be responsive to the local military chain of command.56  
Contracting in Iraq works. The fact that it works is based on a modus vivendi between 
contractors and the local military authorities with the apparent acquiescence or benign neglect 
of some contracting officials. It is not based on the strict application of procurement law and 
policy. Problems are ironed out based on good will. Out-of-scope changes to contract work are 
accommodated. Ratification actions are routinely used to retroactively approve otherwise 
unauthorized actions. In cases where traditional contracting rules are strictly applied, the result 
is often delay and added expense. It goes without saying that in war, delay in getting needed 
work done can result in deaths to personnel and mission failure. 
If the misguided political criticism and excessive oversight applied to some aspects of 
Iraq contracting were generally applied to contracting throughout Iraq, it seems certain the 
modus vivendi would break down. The strict application of procurement law and policy could 
result in a serious decline in the effectiveness of contracting in Iraq and in contingency 
contracting generally. The rejection of the DFARS change proposal is just one example 
illustrating that the contracting community is extremely reticent to sacrifice its principles for 
military principles or the real-world needs of soldiers, contractors and commanders. Apparently 
modest proposals for incremental changes have not worked. Perhaps it is time to examine 
entirely different approaches to providing combat support by contract.   
THE PERSPECTIVE OF HISTORY: CASE STUDY SUMMARIES FROM WORLD 
WAR II AND THEIR LESSONS FOR TODAY 
The lessons of history are frequently ignored or misunderstood. Cryptic comments such 
as “George Washington’s Army relied on contractors. Civilians drove supply wagons” show how 
facts can be accurate but not tell the whole story or convey an accurate picture. Yes, 
Washington’s Army did receive supplies from wagons driven by civilian contractors. However, a 
more revealing fact may be that in 1777 when Washington’s army numbered about 11,000 
troops, the Revolutionary War at sea was primarily being fought by about 11,000 civilian 
seamen serving aboard civilian vessels operating as privateers. United States Navy personnel 
and ships were but a fraction of a much larger naval effort conducted by privateers. The 
reference to “letters of marque and reprisal” in the United States Constitution (Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 
11) illustrates that war has not always been viewed as an “inherently governmental function” as 
certain experts have sometimes claimed.57 Letters of marque were both grants of authority to 
undertake belligerent action and “contracts” that allowed profits to be derived from captured 
                                                
53 Dunn (note 1) op. cit., 24. 
54 Colby (note 26) ibid. 
55 Conference Briefs (note 46), 7. 
56 Colby (note 26) ibid. Dunn (note 1), op. cit., 22-24. 
57 FPI/Annapolis. Remarks of Marcia Bachman (pro-inherently governmental and suggesting civilians in 
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enemy shipping. The United States did not accede to the Declaration of Paris (1856) by which 
many Nations outlawed privateers, but the rise of the United States Navy as a major maritime 
force in the late Nineteenth Century effectively ended the prospect that additional privateers 
would be authorized.     
Some people believe Viet-Nam was the “wrong war,” but even more would probably 
agree that it was a “wrongly fought” war. The United States led with its weakest approach by 
fighting a ground war on the mainland of Asia, something strategists had long-warned against. 
America’s strong point, its airpower, was shackled with restrictions that dramatically reduced its 
effectiveness. The Viet-Nam War in general (but particularly the air war over Viet-Nam) was 
characterized by disunity of command.58 Perhaps, as some believe, the ineffectiveness and the 
disunity of command are related. This may suggest that concern over a lack of unity of 
command (one theme of this paper) is not merely abstract theorizing over “outdated” military 
principles but something that should be seriously considered. 
World War II may initially seem to be an unlikely candidate for providing lessons about 
current events and the subjects addressed in this paper. However, in the pre-war and early 
phases of that war, the United States was resource constrained and had a limited number of 
men in uniform. Contractors picked up some of the slack. Even when the United States built up 
to a force of some 12,000,000 personnel in uniform, some functions were so ubiquitous or 
specialized that civilians performed them.  
The case studies in this part of the paper are presented without any undue expectations 
that they will constitute unequivocal sign posts for current decision makers. It is hoped, 
however, that they will bring a degree of historical perspective to the subject matter. Some 
readers may choose to ignore them. Others may find in them some things that speak to the 
recommendations that follow and show that the recommendations are not merely a rejection of 
the current “business as usual” attitude but attempt to incorporate insights from approaches that 
have worked in the past. At a minimum, it is hoped they will be interesting. 
The Flying Tigers. Much information about the Flying Tigers is available. Unfortunately, 
it exists along side a great volume of misinformation on the same subject. A 1942 motion picture 
about the Flying Tigers starring John Wayne contained a small dose of fact in an otherwise 
fictional and inaccurate portrayal. A book about the Flying Tigers published the same year 
presented a substantially accurate and comprehensive picture of the Tigers and is still worth 
reading.59 Because the US Fourteenth Air Force wore a flying tiger shoulder patch and was 
commanded by the same man (Claire Chennault) who led the Flying Tigers, the name “Flying 
Tigers” is sometimes inaccurately applied to anyone or any unit associated with the Fourteenth 
Air Force in World War II. 
The Flying Tigers are famous in large measure because in the early days of World War 
II when war news was dismal on almost every front, they set a shining example that the 
Japanese could be beaten. American military leaders sang their praise and very early sought to 
have them incorporated into the US Army Air Forces. President Franklin Roosevelt said in April 
1942: “The outstanding gallantry and conspicuous daring of the American Volunteer Group 
combined with their unbelievable efficiency is a source of tremendous pride throughout the 
                                                
58 For example see, Correll. (2005, December). Disunity of command. Air Force, 88. 
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whole of America. The fact that they have labored under […] shortages and difficulties is keenly 
appreciated.”   
The facts presented in this case study are drawn from a number of published and 
primary sources. Most can be found in a few of the best sources.60 How is this story relevant to 
the study at hand? Contrary to myth and misinformation, the Flying Tigers were neither 
members of the US Army Air Forces nor the Chinese Air Force. They were civilian contractors.  
Interestingly, the origins of the name “Flying Tigers” are quite unclear. Almost certainly it 
had something to with the shark mouth (Tiger Shark?) design applied to the nose of the group’s 
Curtiss Tomahawk fighters. Chennault, the group’s leader, professed to be surprised to find that 
his unit was being billed by that name. However, it was soon in common usage, and the Walt 
Disney organization eventually designed a logo for the unit showing a winged tiger flying 
through a V for Victory.  
Claire Lee Chennault retired from the US Army Air Corps in 1937 in the grade of 
Captain. Until April 1942, he held no capacity in the US military other than as a retired regular 
officer. In 1937, he went to China and became an air adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, 
head of the Chinese Nationalist Government. Chennault was on the payroll of the Bank of China 
which was headed by T.V. Soong who was also Minister of Finance and Chiang’s brother-in-
law.  
In July 1937, the “China Incident” erupted. The conflict between Japan and China (1937-
1941) was a war, but the United States classed it as an “incident”; therefore, the US neutrality 
laws did not apply, and the depression-weakened US economy could benefit from trade in war 
goods to both Japan and China. As the conflict went on, the United States’ position gradually 
shifted toward favoring China. By 1939, the United States had imposed a “moral embargo” 
against the export of war materials to Japan. Later, the United States imposed legal embargoes 
against Japan. American loans to China allowed China to purchase war materials from the 
United States and other countries. In September 1940, Japan aligned itself with Germany and 
Italy in the Tri-partite Pact. The United States gradually became virtually a co-belligerent with 
China against Japan. 
The Chinese Air Force was often roughly handled by the Japanese. From 1937 to 1940, 
significant numbers of Soviet “volunteers” and Soviet-supplied aircraft bolstered Chinese air 
efforts. By 1940, most of the Soviet volunteers were withdrawn. Supplies of Soviet aircraft were 
drying up, and Soviet fighters made available to China could not compete with the latest 
Japanese fighters. Late in 1940, Chiang sent a mission to Washington with the mission of 
revitalizing Chinese air efforts. The mission included Chennault, T.V. Soong, and a general of 
the Chinese Air Force. 
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In Washington, the Chinese mission met high government officials. The Secretary of the 
Treasury and Secretary of State were enthusiastic about supplying a 500-plane air force to 
China supported by American pilots and ground crews. The US military was less enthusiastic 
when it heard the plan included supplying the latest B-17 bombers to attack Japan, and pilots 
were to be recruited from the US Army and Navy. The upshot of this was a loan to China that 
allowed them to purchase 100 Tomahawk fighters currently under a British contract and 
eventually permission for Chinese interests to recruit US military pilots. The rest of the plan was 
delayed and eventually resulted in a few hundred fighters and a hand full of medium bombers 
reaching the Chinese in the latter part of 1942. 
The original idea behind this American air force in China was to tie down Japanese 
forces in China, disrupt Japanese supply lines, and even attack the Japanese homeland. It was 
hoped in so doing to make any Japanese move against US interests in Asia difficult, if not 
impossible. Due to delays and indecisiveness, the only fruits of this plan were to be the fielding 
of a combat-ready fighter group in Burma by December 1941. This was the “First American 
Volunteer Group” of the Chinese Air Force, or Flying Tigers. 
Aircraft for this unit were 100 Curtiss Tomahawk II fighters diverted from a British order. 
These are sometimes referred to as P-40Bs and sometimes as P-40Cs. The aircraft were in 
production as Tomahawk II/P-40C models when the order was switched from Britain to China. 
Once British specifications for the fighters were no longer applicable, Curtiss decided to 
incorporate certain parts left over from P-40B production in some of the fighters—making the 
fighters something of a hybrid model. Armament was supplied later. Two different types of rifle-
caliber wing guns (.303 caliber and 7.92 millimeter) were eventually mounted on the fighters, 
and they were equipped with commercially available radios.  
In April 1941, recruitment of American pilots was authorized. This was accomplished 
mainly through representatives of the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company-Federal 
(CAMCO), a company incorporated under the China Trade Act, which operated an aircraft 
factory and had other interests in China. CAMCO was a subsidiary of Intercontinent Corp. with 
headquarters in New York. Almost all the pilots recruited were reserve officers serving on active 
duty in the Army, Navy or Marine Corps. The exceptions were one Marine regular officer and 
one Navy enlisted pilot. 
The general terms of recruitment authorized for the pilots allowed them to (1) resign their 
commissions and sever all ties to the US Military; (2) immediately sign an employment contract 
with CAMCO; and (3) promised, should they later seek it, reinstatement in their branch of 
service, impliedly at a grade and seniority equal to that of their contemporaries who remained 
on active duty. Their employment contracts with CAMCO stated they were to “perform such 
duties as the Employer may direct.” Salaries started at $600 per month (about three times 
service pay). Transportation and incidental expenses were authorized. Pilots were required to 
maintain at their own expense a $10,000 life insurance policy. In event of death or disability they 
(or their estates) were to be paid six month’s salary. Travel documents were supplied (none of 
their passports identified them as pilots). Not included in writing was a promise of a $500 bonus 
for each Japanese aircraft destroyed. 
About the time the first pilots were being signed up by CAMCO, the first of the crated 
Tomahawks arrived at Rangoon, Burma. The British authorities permitted workers from 
CAMCO’s factory at Loiwing, China, to assemble the fighters at an airfield near Rangoon. By 
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Intercontinent and CAMCO, had arranged with the British to turn over Kyedaw airfield near 
Toungoo, Burma, as a training base for the Americans.  
On 1 August 1941, Chiang Kai-shek signed an order constituting the “First American 
Volunteer Group” to be organized by “Col. Chennault” with the American volunteer fliers now 
arriving in China in order “to participate in the war.” Although Chennault at that time used the 
title Colonel, he was a Colonel in neither the US nor Chinese Air Force. Subsequently, he would 
sign A.V.G. paper work as “C.L. Chennault, Commanding” without any indication of rank. 
Indeed, neither Chennault nor any of the pilots were at that time members of any air force.  
From August to early December 1941, the aircraft and men of the A.V.G. gradually 
assembled at Kyedaw and began training under Chennault’s expert tutelage. Three squadrons 
were organized each with a squadron leader and flight leaders. Although military organization 
and air discipline were adopted, minor military courtesies and regulations were not. During this 
period, liaison was established between the A.V.G. and Army Air Force officials in the 
Philippines. As war approached, vital spare parts for the A.V.G. were shipped from the United 
States and, in some cases, even flown to Asia aboard the Pan American Clipper. 
By December 1941, the A.V.G. was preparing to move to Kunming, its base in China. 
Each squadron in the A.V.G. had at least twenty operational fighters and a slightly larger 
number of pilots. Training had taken a toll of several Tomahawks destroyed or damaged as well 
as a couple pilot deaths. A couple more Tomahawks lacked armament, and others were 
unserviceable due to lack of spare parts. A few pilots had resigned in disgust due to conditions 
at Kyedaw which included not only minimal facilities but tropical heat, dust, disease and odors.  
Soon after the Pacific War began, the A.V.G. flew its first mission. Three Tomahawks, 
one modified for photographic work, flew a reconnaissance to Bangkok on December 10th. A 
few days later, Chennault and most of the A.V.G moved to Kunming where, on December 20th, 
the A.V.G. entered combat for the first time and shot down several Japanese bombers, putting 
an end to Japanese raids on Kunming for a considerable period. This combat did not make the 
A.V.G. world-wide news. A report of the combat appeared on page 27 of the New York Times. 
President Roosevelt’s assistant, Dr. Lauchlin Currie, had already recommended that 
Chennault and his organization be inducted into the US military as a force in being in Asia. The 
US Army soon began making inquiries along those lines. Chennault began to sound out 
Chiang’s views on the subject via Madame Chiang (who had served as head of the Chinese 
Aeronautical Commission). Chennault indicated there were certain advantages to China if the 
A.V.G. were incorporated into the US Army Air Force. These included that China would save 
money, reinforcements would be more likely, and there would be fewer disciplinary problems 
among the “enlisted personnel.” The “enlisted personnel” were for the most part actually former 
enlisted men who had been released from active duty along the same lines as the A.V.G. pilots. 
They, with some personnel recruited in Asia, constituted the technical and administrative staff of 
the A.V.G. Chennault suggested the issue of discrepancy in pay could be handled by China 
supplementing the salaries of inducted A.V.G. members until their original contracts expired. 
The only down-side Chennault mentioned was that an officer unfamiliar with China (meaning 
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pointed out that Chennault was quite prepared to be recalled to active duty in the Army, but not 
at a rank below Brigadier General.61  
Meanwhile, one squadron of the A.V.G. had been moved to Mingaladon airfield north of 
Rangoon. Here, beginning on December 23rd the A.V.G. and a British squadron of Brewster 
Buffalo fighters met units of the Japanese Army Air Force in a series of clashes over several 
days. Both sides suffered losses, but the Allies and particularly the A.V.G., claimed spectacular 
successes. They became front page news. By early 1942, the American volunteer pilots fighting 
over Burma, soon called the Flying Tigers, were known throughout America.  
The Flying Tigers continued to defend Rangoon and southern Burma until early March 
1942 when Rangoon fell. In doing so, they operated in coordination with and under the general 
direction of the local British command. They withdrew to central Burma, and then in April to 
Lashio. A.V.G. squadrons periodically rotated from China to combat operations in Burma.  
Most of the Japanese fighters encountered by the Flying Tigers were fixed landing gear 
army Type 97 fighters. However, intermittently they clashed with army Type 1 fighters flown by 
the 64th Hiko Sentai (Flying Regiment) that were routinely mistaken for the Japanese navy’s 
Type Zero fighter, the fighter that had devastated Chinese-flown Soviet-built fighters in 1940 
and early 1941. Their claims of success over the formidable Zero fighter only added to the luster 
of their reputation.  
The Chinese Army had intervened to help the Allied cause in Burma. By late April 1942, 
it had been thrown back to the borders of western China and was being hard-pressed by the 
Japanese in the mountains and gorges bordering the Salween River. Instead of flying air 
combat missions where Japanese aircraft could be destroyed and $500 bonuses won, 
Chennault ordered A.V.G. pilots to strafe Japanese troop columns in the narrow gorges. Similar 
missions had been ordered and flown earlier in the campaign. Both A.V.G. pilots and planes 
were pretty worn out by this point, and some pilots’ morale was low. This led to a “revolt” of 
sorts by some of the pilots who refused to fly such missions. Other pilots were called in to fly a 
few strafing missions, but ground strafing was soon strictly limited.  
While the A.V.G. was gaining fame it, was also encountering problems common to many 
military organizations. In addition to the “revolt” mentioned above, there were many routine 
disciplinary problems and some “resignations.” Some of the “enlisted men” brought Chinese 
women on base and engaged in inappropriate conduct. Some of the pilots declined to fly in 
combat; others were rowdy and drank too much. There were threats of courts-martial but 
everyone understood they had no basis. Some men were fired, sent home early. Those that 
resigned without adequate excuse were considered “dishonorably” discharged. There was no 
basis for this either, but the concept actually took on meaning many years later. Chennault was 
left with “disciplinary” measures such as limiting the number of drinks a rowdy pilot was allowed 
at the Kunming hostel’s bar. 
To be plain, the “commanding officer” of this famous and successful fighting unit was 
actually not even the official supervisor of the men he “commanded.” Chennault was paid by the 
Bank of China but was acting as an air advisor to Chiang and commander of the A.V.G., 
ostensibly a unit of the Chinese Air Force. The A.V.G. officially existed as a unit of the Chinese 
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Air Force pursuant to Chiang’s order; however, the A.V.G. pilots and mechanics were not 
members of the Chinese Air Force or subject to its discipline. They were employees of CAMCO. 
Chennault had no official relationship to CAMCO. The A.V.G. was not part of the Chinese Air 
Force chain of command. Chennault reported only to Chiang and was not subject to the corrupt 
and ineffective Chinese Air Force. Most of the fighting the A.V.G. did was in support of, and 
under the general direction of, the British in Burma.  
The astute reader at this point might note, that “these fellows may have been 
contractors, but they were contractors hired by the Chinese not American contractors.” Could 
any lessons to be found in this case study possibly be valid? It is probably more than a minor 
point that the money China used to buy the aircraft and pay the pilots was borrowed from the 
United States and probably never paid back; and, that the whole idea of an American air force in 
China was meant to serve America’s strategic interests. The plot thickens further, however! 
In April 1942, Chennault returned to active duty in the US Army Air Forces and was 
promoted to Brigadier General. This ended his informal contacts with the White House. He now 
had to report through the theater chain of command. In some respects, Chennault’s status did 
not change. He remained “commanding officer” of the A.V.G. (of the Chinese Air Force). The 
time was coming, however, when the A.V.G. would cease to exist and an official US military 
organization would take its place. Chiang had agreed to this, and the date for transition had 
been set as 4 July 1942. 
By June 1942, American Army pilots were arriving in China and learning the ropes from 
A.V.G. veterans. They would become the 23rd Fighter Group and successors to the Flying 
Tigers. Chennault was slated to become the commander of the China Air Task Force of the 
Tenth Air Force. The 23rd Fighter Group and a small detachment of bombers would report to 
him. Meanwhile, efforts were underway to recruit pilots of the Flying Tigers into the Army. 
Chennault was shunted aside in the induction process, and very few Tigers agreed to 
sign on as Army pilots. The few that did played key roles in the 23rd Fighter Group. Several 
other Tigers extended their contracts to fly with the 23rd Fighter Group on its early missions. One 
was killed in action during this contract extension. Before an appropriate Army officer was found 
to command the 23rd Fighter Group, Chennault appointed one of his civilian pilots to command 
the Group! Most of the fighters initially flown by the 23rd Fighter Group were owned by the 
Chinese and included a fair number of the original Tomahawks that had seen many months of 
hard combat service with inadequate maintenance. 
Pilots of the Flying Tigers received numerous Chinese awards. More remarkably, these 
contractors received American and British decorations. Chennault was awarded the 
Distinguished Service Cross. At least ten Tigers received American or British Distinguished 
Flying Crosses. As will be discussed later, service with the A.V.G. eventually was legally 
determined to be active duty in the US military. A few weeks ago, Dick Rossi, six victory ace 
with the Flying Tigers, told me how surprised he was to receive an Honorable Discharge 
certificate from the US Air Force some years back. Dick never served in the US Air Force or 
Army Air Forces! 
Pacific Base Contractors—Wake Island. The story of Wake Island and the role 
contractors played there is shorter both in time and in this narrative than the story of the Flying 
Tigers. Like the Flying Tigers, the Wake Island story was inspirational for the American people 
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spawned movies of varying degrees of fidelity to actual events (including one starring John 
Wayne) as well as numerous books, articles, and television retrospectives. The principle 
sources relied upon for this case study include official histories, popular literature and a primary 
source document.62  
To avoid any confusion, the story of the defense of Wake Island in early World War II is 
primarily the story of heroic and efficient military men commanded by Cdr. Winfield S. 
Cunningham, USN. The primary fighting units on the island were an under-strength battalion 
(First Defense Battalion) of Marines commanded by Maj. James Devereux and a similarly 
under-strength Marine fighter squadron (VMF-211) commanded by Maj. Paul Putnam. The 
Marine ground troops had arrived only a couple months before war broke out, and the fighter 
planes arrived only days before the attack on Hawaii.  
A Japanese air attack on the first day of the war destroyed the majority of the Marine 
fighters. Wake Island had no radar, and the defenders were taken by surprise when cloud cover 
helped mask the approaching Japanese bombers. An invasion attempt a few days later was 
soundly repulsed thanks to Devereux’s coastal guns and attacks by Putnam’s remaining F4F-3 
Wildcat fighters. The defenders sank two destroyers, put a transport out of action, damaged 
other warships, and inflicted over four hundred casualties on the Japanese. This news greatly 
cheered the American public at a time when otherwise all the news was bad. 
From the Japanese point of view: “Considering the power accumulated for the invasion 
of Wake Island, and the meager forces of the defenders, it was one of the most humiliating 
defeats our Navy had ever suffered.”63 The Japanese regrouped and prepared for a second 
invasion attempt when they could receive support from their task force returning from the attack 
on Hawaii. Meanwhile, the atoll and its defenders were subjected to repeated bombing attacks. 
A second landing attempt in the early hours of 23 December 1941 was conducted by 
stealth rather than direct challenge to Wake’s coastal batteries. Japanese landing troops got 
ashore and fierce fighting ensued with the Japanese troops receiving supporting fire from both 
ships and aircraft. The outnumbered defenders suffered casualties and were thrown back but, 
they also inflicted casualties on the Japanese and dislodged them from strong points in counter-
attacks. An approaching American task force would be unable to provide any relief to Wake for 
at least a full day. With the defending force divided, communications unreliable, and unclear 
how much damage they had inflicted on the Japanese, Cdr. Cunningham bowed to the 
inevitable and surrendered the atoll.  
Before the war, Wake Island was a refueling and rest stop for the Pan American clipper. 
For about five years, a few dozen employees of Pan Am were the only substantial presence on 
Wake. Late in 1940, a contract was awarded to the “Contractors Pacific Naval Air Bases” 
organization for a three-year effort to turn Wake Island into a major naval air base. Construction 
workers were recruited from men who had worked on big construction projects such as the 
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Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams. The advance party of construction workers arrived on the 
island in January 1941.  
When the first Marines arrived late in 1941, they found they were greatly outnumbered 
by the construction workers. Devereux’s battalion eventually reached about half strength—or 
roughly 450 Marines. A service detachment from Marine Air Group 21, the pilots of VMF-211, 
and other navy men and marines added less than a hundred additional personnel to the military 
total. Civilian construction workers reporting to contractor superintendent Daniel Teeters 
numbered about 1,150.  
The contractor had dynamite, bulldozers, dredging equipment, and other tools, but the 
workers were unarmed. Devereux’s Marines began work on defense installations. They were 
armed, but equipped with little more than picks and shovels for construction work. Short of 
manpower, the Marines worked in twelve-hour shifts. Teeters’ men continued with their contract 
work, but Teeters loaned the Marines a bulldozer and other equipment to help them prepare 
gun emplacements, bomb shelters and defensive positions. 
Early in November, Devereux received a warning message: “International situation 
indicates you should be on the alert.” Devereux sent a return message: “Does international 
situation indicate employment of contractor’s men on defense installations which are far from 
complete?” Devereux met with Teeters and Lt. Cdr. Elmer Greey, the military supervisor of 
construction, and began planning for the use of the civilian contractor work force and equipment 
to aid in completing high-priority fortifications. Devereux assumed he would be granted 
permission to employ the contractor’s resources on the highest priority projects. The reply from 
Pearl Harbor denied Devereux the permission he requested. Devereux could only assume the 
international situation was not as critical as the earlier warning message had indicated. 
Devereux’s battalion was equipped with old weapons, some dating back to World War I; 
but, it had an impressive array of them. These included six 5-inch guns; twelve 3-inch guns; 
eighteen .50 caliber machine guns; and, thirty .30 caliber machine guns. Only one of the 3-inch 
guns came with its full fire-control equipment. The biggest problem was that Devereux did not 
have sufficient manpower to man all the weapons. His men were also equipped with 
submachine guns, rifles and pistols, but naval personnel on the island and a small army 
communications team were unarmed.  
On the morning of December 8th, Wake received notice of events occurring in Hawaii 
(where it was December 7th). Soon, Wake received its first air raid and suffered its first 
casualties. Wake’s lone Navy doctor was ordered to take over the contractor’s hospital which 
was larger than the marine aid station. Teeters and several of his men soon volunteered their 
services to the military. 
On the first day, Teeters and 185 construction workers volunteered their help to the 
Marines. Teeters kept the volunteers on the payroll and also released equipment and supplies 
whenever needed. This initial group was soon joined by a hundred others and, eventually, over 
300 civilians worked alongside the Marines. Bomb damage was repaired. Food and fuel were 
dispersed and camouflaged. Empty gasoline drums were cleaned and used to store fresh water.  
Teeters took over one of Devereux’s major problems by feeding Marines that were now 
dispersed all around the island. Civilians stood watch along with Marines. Volunteers with no 
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might be injured or killed in battle. At one 5-inch battery, a party of 25 civilians helped Marines 
repair bomb damage and maintain camouflage. The civilians took over all work involved in 
handling ammunition for the battery.  
The 5-inch guns were permanently emplaced. The 3-inch guns were moved to new 
positions after each (almost daily) air raid. This was done in hours of darkness using entirely 
civilian labor and equipment. Sixteen civilians under a Marine Sergeant were trained as a gun 
crew to man a 3-inch gun, which was part of a previously unmanned battery on Peale Island. 
Most civilians that did not volunteer to help the Marines continued with their contract 
work. Unfortunately, the civilians had not learned to disperse during air raids. On December 9th, 
a Japanese bombing attack hit Camp No. 2; fifty-five civilians were killed. Several others had 
been lost the previous day.  
After beating off a Japanese invasion attempt on December 11th, the defense of Wake 
was headline news as were the repeated air raids the atoll had suffered. This did not stop 
construction headquarters in Hawaii from insisting that the dredging of the channel continue and 
demanding to know when the task would be completed. Other messages seemed to indicate 
slightly more awareness that Wake was under attack. One message had suggestions for 
replacing damaged window glass. The barracks buildings that had once had windows had all 
been destroyed! 
During the second Japanese invasion attempt, contractors fought as infantry beside the 
Marines. Virtually all accounts credit the civilians who actively participated in Wake’s defense as 
making a significant contribution to the action there. Had all the civilians been armed and 
participated in the atoll’s defense, the defenders would actually have outnumbered the 
Japanese landing forces. Surviving civilians and military, alike, subsequently endured years of 
brutal Japanese captivity. About one hundred civilian contractors were retained on Wake by the 
Japanese to act as laborers. They were murdered by the Japanese in October 1943. 
Before Pearl Harbor, the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks began organizing units 
known as “Headquarters Construction Companies.” These units were to be utilized as 
administrative units by officers in charge of construction at advanced bases in case war 
interrupted contract operations. Only one such company had been organized by 7 December 
1941. It formed the nucleus of the first Construction Detachment which deployed to Bora Bora at 
the end of January 1942. 
With the advent of the war, it became apparent that the services of contractors and their 
civilian employees could not adequately be utilized for construction work in combat zones. 
Under military law, the contractor’s forces in their status as civilians could not offer resistance 
when the bases they were constructing were under attack. A civilian bearing arms would have 
been considered a guerilla and, as such, would have been liable to summary execution if 
captured. Furthermore, it was all too clear that civilian workers lacked the training to defend 
themselves. This was part of the lesson learned at Wake, Cavite, and Guam.64  
At the end of December 1941, the Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks advised the 
Bureau of Naval Personnel that construction work at advanced bases could only be 
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satisfactorily carried out by using military personnel under direct military command. It was 
recommended that early steps should be taken toward organizing military construction forces. 
Initial recommendations were for three battalions of about a thousand men each.  
These recommendations led to the creation of “Construction Battalions”—better known 
as Seabees. Initially recruitment was directed at men already skilled in the construction trades. 
Qualified recruits were offered classification as Petty Officers based on their civilian construction 
experience and age. In the early days of the organization, the average Seabee enlisted with a 
rate of petty officer, second class, equivalent to an army staff sergeant. Average pay and 
allowances of $140 per month made Seabees among the highest paid groups in the military 
service. By the time Seabee recruitment was modified in December 1942, about 60 battalions 
had been formed.  
Whether or not the rationale quoted above was a strictly accurate reflection of 
international law, it does accurately reflect some of the motivation for creation of the Seabees. 
Had the construction workers on Wake Island all been trained to fight and had they been in 
uniform under military command, there is a high probability Wake Island could have held out 
longer possibly until a relief effort was mounted. 
Merchant Marine and other examples. The formation of the Flying Tigers and the 
unsuccessful plans to bomb Japan before Pearl Harbor illustrate that the United States had 
assumed something akin to a co-belligerent status with China against Japan long before the 
“Day of Infamy.” In the Atlantic, the United States moved from providing Great Britain with fifty 
overage destroyers in 1940, to escorting convoys far across the Atlantic, attacking German 
submarines, and occupying Iceland in 1941. The German Declaration of War referred to 
America’s “open acts of war” and alleged the United States “virtually created a state of war.” 
One of the few ways Germany could directly strike back at America once war had formally 
begun was to attack our merchant shipping. This it did with a vengeance.65  
The death rate among American civilian mariners in World War II was higher than that 
among any of the Armed Forces except for the US Marine Corps.66 More than 250,000 officers 
and crewmen served aboard US merchant vessels in World War II. Over seven hundred ships 
(each exceeding 1,000 gross tons displacement) were sunk. An estimated 6,800 seamen were 
killed and 11,000 wounded. At least six hundred others became prisoners of war. 
Merchant vessels kept Britain in the war. Without the lifeblood of supplies carried by 
merchant ships, Britain would have been forced to capitulate. Winston Churchill remarked that 
the closest Britain came to losing the war was when the U-boat menace was at its worst. One of 
the worst moments of the war for the United States came in the early months of 1942 when 
dozens (145 in 3 months) of American merchant ships were being sunk within sight of the 
American coastline.  
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As bad as was the threat posed by enemy submarines, it was not the only threat faced 
by merchant ships. Merchant ships were also subject to attack by enemy aircraft and surface 
forces and encountered other hostile conditions. In addition to carrying supplies between ports, 
merchant ships also participated in amphibious operations along side transports and cargo 
ships of the Navy. At Leyte Gulf, for example, merchant ships were among the first victims of 
kamikaze attacks. 
A year before Pearl Harbor, the Coast Guard began training merchant seaman in military 
subjects—including gunnery. Units of the Naval Reserve also provided military training to 
merchant seaman. By September 1941, gunnery training for merchant crewman on 83 
Panamanian flagged vessels had been authorized. In November 1941, Congress ended a 
Neutrality Act ban on arming US flagged merchant ships. Thereafter, merchant seaman 
received expanded military training including gunnery, handling barrage balloons, wartime 
communications, gas warfare, swimming through burning oil, and spotting enemy ships at night. 
On some merchant ships, uniformed sailors manned the guns. In such cases, civilian 
seamen usually were reserve members of the gun crew or ammunition handlers. On other 
merchant ships, civilian seamen served as the primary gun crews in addition to their other 
duties. 
Wartime brought several changes in status for merchant seamen. Many seamen 
became Federal employees under the auspices of the War Shipping Administration. The 
majority of merchant ships were placed under the control of the Army or Navy. The “articles” 
under which seamen sailed were made less specific and might give a seaman only a vague 
idea of where a voyage might take him or how dangerous it would be. A seaman who attempted 
to resign during the course of a voyage or otherwise violated military policy was subject to 
courts-martial (over 100 merchant seamen actually were convicted by courts-martial).    
It is interesting to note that at the same time, one part of the Navy was determining that 
civilian contract workers were unsuitable for building (and possibly defending) advanced bases, 
another part of the Navy was intensifying its training of civilian seaman to defend the merchant 
ships on which they served. It is also interesting to note that while construction workers were 
intensely recruited and later drafted, members of the merchant marine were exempt from the 
draft (and in some cases released from military service) on the grounds that they were 
performing a service essential to the war effort. Admiral Nimitz even referred to the merchant 
marine as “an auxiliary of the Army and Navy in time of war.”   
General Richard B. Meyer’s statement that in Operation Desert Strom, Military Sealift 
Command and the merchant marine vessels delivered more than 450 shiploads of cargo in 
seven months amounting to 95 percent of the US cargo required for the war is a recent and 
telling example as far as the continued relevance of the merchant marine is concerned. General 
Meyer also noted the work of the merchant marine in Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the 
strategic implications of its movement of the 4th Infantry Division. It is also interesting that legal 
authority to arm merchant vessels still exists (10 USC. 351). 
Two other brief examples may add some perspective to our inquiry. The first relates to 
the Coastal Patrol of the Civil Air Patrol.67 The Civil Air Patrol (CAP) was created just prior to 
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World War II. CAP volunteers (private pilots and aircraft owners) were contractors in the sense 
that when they flew missions for the Army Air Force, they agreed to carry out the mission and 
were allowed access to aviation fuel and reimbursed for certain expenses upon agreed terms. 
The CAP and its value to the Army was the subject of debates that ranged from whether its 
activities were worthwhile to whether it should be militarized. Eventually, the CAP proved its 
utility in a variety of roles. 
One mission assigned to the CAP was the Coastal Patrol. The Coastal Patrol was an 
anti-submarine patrol initiated in response to U-boat incursions close to the US coast that took a 
heavy toll of merchant shipping beginning in January 1942. This was primarily a Navy 
responsibility, but in the early days of World War II, the Navy was overwhelmed and the Army 
was required to share in this mission. The Army too had few resources, and, as a result, a 30-
day experiment was authorized during which the CAP’s civilian aircraft flown by civilian crews (a 
pilot and an observer) would supplement the military effort. Some of the more substantial CAP 
aircraft (Stinson, Waco, Cessna, and other types equipped with 90 horsepower engines or 
larger) were used for this work. The 30-day experimental program was extended to a 90-day 
experimental program and then made indefinite. The CAP Coastal Patrol eventually went on for 
eighteen months—as long as the Army retained a role in anti-submarine warfare. 
Missions were flown up to 50 miles off-shore. In initial operations the civilian planes were 
unarmed. The idea was that they would sight enemy submarines and then radio for assistance. 
The German U-boats, not knowing the planes were unarmed, usually crash-dived at their 
approach and eluded armed aircraft arriving later. In one case, a German U-boat crash-dived off 
the New Jersey coast in shallow water and became stuck in the mud. The CAP plane circled the 
submarine for an hour as it tried to extricate itself. The plane radioed for help, but eventually the 
submarine freed itself and went on its way unharmed. Some CAP observers brought their 
privately owned cameras along and returned with photos of surfaced German submarines and 
their surprised crews scrambling off the decks to get below and submerge. 
Within a few months of initial operations, CAP Coastal Patrol planes were equipped with 
bomb racks and makeshift bomb sights. After the middle of 1942, the U-boat menace near 
American shores lessened but did not entirely disappear. CAP continued flying patrol missions 
until late summer 1943. In some patrol areas, the CAP alternated patrols with the Navy. Other 
areas were covered exclusively by the CAP. They eventually operated from 21 bases. 
This civilian effort was tremendous. The CAP Coastal Patrol flew 86,685 missions 
involving 244,600 flying hours. It spotted 173 submarines and was credited with destroying or 
damaging two exclusive of those destroyed by the Army and Navy based on CAP sightings. In 
addition, it reported 91 vessels in distress and the presence of 17 floating mines. In rescue 
missions, it was responsible for rescuing 363 survivors and the recovery of 36 bodies. It 
reported hundreds of irregularities at sea and made over a 1,000 special investigations at sea or 
along the coast line. At the request of the Navy, it performed 5,684 special convoy missions. 
During the course of these operations, 26 CAP members lost their lives, 7 were seriously 
injured, and 90 aircraft were lost.  
The final vignette involves Charles A. Lindbergh. Lindbergh was probably America’s 
most famous aviator. His New York to Paris flight was the first solo flight across the Atlantic and 
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the years just preceding World War II, he was an outspoken critic of President Roosevelt and 
his policy of pushing America into an unofficial alliance with Britain against Germany.68 
Lindbergh was certain this would involve the United States unnecessarily in a European war. 
Roosevelt had other critics, but few with the influence and star-power of Lindbergh. In April 
1941, after Roosevelt publicly questioned his loyalty, Lindbergh resigned his reserve 
commission. After war, started Lindbergh sought to enter the Army Air Force. Roosevelt would 
have none of it. 
Lindbergh offered his services to various aviation-related companies with whom he had 
advisory relationships, but the White House made its position known to companies that wanted 
to play a role in national defense. Lindbergh was unwelcome. Only Ford, in the process of 
converting from producing cars to bombers, would hire him. He was soon flying and solving 
problems with aircraft built by a number of different companies. 
Eventually in 1944, Lindbergh managed a trip to the South Pacific where he flew fighters 
on combat missions demonstrating his techniques of cruise control for extending combat range. 
In flights in Marine F4U Corsair fighters, no enemy aircraft were encountered but Lindbergh did 
engage in strafing and dive-bombing ground targets as well as flying patrol and bomber escorts 
totaling fourteen missions. Lindbergh then traveled to New Guinea and demonstrated his 
techniques to fighter pilots of the Fifth Air Force. 
Lindbergh visited units equipped with long range P-38 fighters. He taught them how to 
get even more range out of their fighters. At the end of June 1944, he began flying combat 
missions with the 475th Fighter Group. On July 28th, Lindbergh finally ran into enemy aerial 
opposition and shot down Capt. Saburo Shimada, a veteran pilot and commander of the 
Japanese army’s 73rd Independent Flying Squadron. Shimada was flying a Type-99 Army 
Reconnaissance plane (Ki 51)—a plane much slower but much more maneuverable than the P-
38. Before Lindbergh shot him down, Shimada had eluded other P-38 pilots in a series of low-
level engagements. 
In mid-August, shortly before he was to return to the United States, Lindbergh was 
officially grounded. The Fighter Group commander that had flown on the mission with him had 
been reprimanded a few days after the mission on July 28th. Lindbergh had been in New Guinea 
for nearly two months; and, his flights were hardly a secret, but not until more than ten days 
after the shoot down was any action taken. Lindbergh suspected the reprimand and grounding 
had nothing to do with the shoot down. The Fifth Fighter Command had turned down requests 
to escort bombers to Palau on the basis that the distance was too far and the weather too 
difficult. Lindbergh’s missions with the 475th demonstrated that the P-38 could fly far enough to 
escort the bombers to Palau. It was official embarrassment over this, rather than risking the life 
of a national hero that he suspected was the real cause of official displeasure. As far as appears 
in the record, no one seemed to mind that a civilian shot down an enemy combatant. 
Current relevance and implications. There can be little doubt that the official position 
of the US Government during World War II was that, consistent with international law, civilians 
should not take up arms and directly participate in combat. The creation of the Seabees was in 
part motivated by this concern. Despite this, these case studies provide several examples of 
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official sponsorship of civilians in combat roles. Before the war, the Flying Tigers were a semi-
covert operation. In April 1942, President Roosevelt publicly praised them. The American 
people may not have been fully informed of their status at that time, but President Roosevelt 
was certainly aware of it. They would never have been released from active duty and recruited 
by CAMCO for service in the A.V.G. without Presidential approval. Wake Island and Lindbergh’s 
flights might be considered aberrations authorized by local commanders. Arming the merchant 
marine and the Civil Air Patrol and sending them on missions where they were likely to 
encounter the enemy were clearly reasoned decisions made after due governmental 
deliberation. These case studies seem to indicate an inconsistent attitude toward civilians 
participating in combat, de jure opposed to such participation but, at least on a practical level, 
permissive.  
Some of these case studies suggest that civilians who are subject to no actual military 
authority or discipline may, nonetheless, act as if they are. It appears that association with a 
cause larger than the individual, team spirit and a can-do attitude about getting a job done may 
go a long way toward forming a cohesive group that acts as if it was subject to the chain of 
command. Informal adherence to the chain of command may be common, but the case studies 
show examples of derelictions, for example, among some of the Flying Tigers and some 
contractors on Wake Island.  
These case studies illustrate trends stemming back to World War II that are evident in 
current circumstances and policies as discussed earlier in this paper. Despite an official position 
against direct civilian participation in combat, current policies do not really create a bright 
demarcation between direct and indirect participation. We should not be surprised, 
notwithstanding current policies, if we find instances of civilians participating directly in combat. 
The possible existence of an “informal chain of command” that masks a lack of unity of 
command as discussed earlier is supported by ample evidence from these case studies. 
The case studies show that despite having some 12,000,000 troops in uniform in World 
War II, there was still ample room for civilian contractors to play important roles supporting 
America’s warfighting efforts. Rather than an “either-or” or “one size fits all” approach, these 
case studies show a variety of different approaches to obtaining the needed expertise available 
in the civilian sector and augmenting military forces with forces of civilians. 
In some instances, civilians were put in uniform and asked to perform essentially military 
functions but at enhanced salaries. The uniform might be that of a quasi-military organization 
(Flying Tigers) or a special corps of the US Military (Seabees). In other cases, seaman were 
armed and sent into harm’s way in a civilian status but were subject to courts-martial jurisdiction 
and certain military rules (merchant marine). Civilians were permitted to cross the line between 
direct and indirect participation in combat when it seemed practical to allow it due to exigent 
circumstances (Wake Island) or in order to take advantage of specialized civilian expertise 
(Lindbergh). Direct civilian participation in combat was officially authorized when there was little 
likelihood the civilians would be captured by the enemy and, thus, held to account for 
participating in combat (CAP Coastal Patrol). 
Some of the examples show that local commanders need to be able to prioritize the 
tasks contractor personnel perform even if they are outside the normal scope of work of the 
contract (Wake Island pre-war). In other cases, it makes sense for the operational commander 
rather than the contract supervisor to provide day-to-day direction to personnel (Flying Tigers). 
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cases a formal military relationship (Seabees) or at least the enforcement of military discipline 
(merchant marine) was deemed important. 
It should be noted that pursuant to law, the service of some civilians can be recognized 
as “active military service.”69 Honorably discharged Flying Tigers, active participants in the 
defense of Wake Island, and certain merchant mariners are among those whose service has 
been so recognized. The benefits that flow from such recognition are usually minimal. There 
certainly is a symbolic significance involved. This form of recognition may also increase the 
relevance of these case studies to the recommendations below.   
Drawing what lessons we can from the foregoing case studies and discussion, the next 
section suggests policies and approaches that may meet the goals set out earlier in this paper. 
Those goals are (1) vest actual control over in-theater contractor personnel in the theater 
commander and his military subordinates, (2) avoid the direct participation of civilians in combat, 
and (3) treat contractor personnel who are subject to the hazards of combat essentially the 
same way soldiers are treated so far as force protection, administrative support and amenities 
are concerned. 
ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM   
Some of the suggestions in this part of the paper will require changes in law, regulations, 
current policies, and traditional concepts. Decision makers or their staff assistants 
uncomfortable with such suggestions are hereby put on notice! 
A United Kingdom model: The Sponsored reserve. Under Britain’s Reserve Forces 
Act of 1996, a new category of volunteer reserves was created: the sponsored reserve. The first 
sponsored reserve unit, the Mobile Meteorological Unit (MMU) was formed in 2000.70 The new 
category changes the relationship between the reservist, their employer, and the Ministry of 
Defense (MoD). According to Jim Sharpe, Chief Met. Officer at Strike Command: 
In a sponsored Reserve Unit there is a three-way partnership, where a company or 
 agency agrees to provide capability and skilled staff through a formal agreement with 
 MoD. The individuals concerned also have an agreement with the relevant arm of the 
 forces to serve for an agreed period, and with the employer who, in the case of the 
 MMU, is responsible for paying the reservist and providing the tools of the trade.71   
The purpose of the sponsored reserve is to allow the military to make “greater use of 
skills in the civil sector.” In the case of the MMU, the civilian employer was a government 
agency. More typically, the employer would be a commercial company. 
According to a summary of Authoritative Guidance on the Sponsored Reserve: 
                                                
69 Sec. 401, Public Law 95-202, 91 Stat. 1449 (1977) (codified at 38 USC. 106 note).  
70 UK Meteorological Office. (2000, October 27). Rapid reaction Met. men to be first sponsored reserves. 
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1. MOD [may] require its contractors to deliver certain designated services by staff who 
have Sponsored Reserve (SR) status. Thus, a contract for services may be delivered 
through SRs not only in peacetime but also in operations in a non-benign environment. 
2. A SR may either be employed and paid by MOD or remain employed and paid by their 
civilian employer. The latter option is preferred since it offers the benefit of continuity 
and reduced administration whilst having no impact on the degree of command and 
control MOD has over the SR when he […] is Called-Out or under Service Training. 
3. Before SR draft terms and conditions specific to any particular project are offered to 
tenderers, it is important to ensure that in addition to usual project stakeholders, Centre 
and single Service Authorities with SR interest are consulted.72  
The UK Sponsored Reserve approach has a number of interesting features and 
deserves study. The basic idea of being both in a military status and being paid by a private 
employer is one that is discussed below. The idea of maintaining military command and control 
over personnel that are essentially contractor employees is likewise important. 
 Reserve forces in the UK are structured differently than in the United States. The 
volunteer reserve (of which the SR is only a small part) makes up only about 15% of the 
combined total of regular forces and volunteer reserves. In the case of the Royal Air Force, the 
figure is less than 4%. Neither the structure of UK military forces nor the purpose of the 
Sponsored Reserve (obtaining civilian skills) make the wholesale importation of the Sponsored 
Reserve concept into the US military scene necessarily desirable or one that promises a 
universal solution for all issues related to contracted combat support. 
In Britain, the Sponsored Reserve is not primarily used as a means of large scale 
augmentation of deployed forces but rather to maintain continuity of services performed by 
civilians in peacetime and assure that deploying support personnel are in a military status. The 
Sponsored Reserve concept would seem to be a closer fit for deployed weapons system 
contractors (or other specialists) than for LOGCAP-type contracts. It might be particularly 
suitable in instances where weapons system contractors are involved in the actual operation of 
a weapon system or in maintenance and support that can take place on the battlefield. It seems 
probable, however, that a concept along the lines of Britain’s Sponsored Reserve could find, at 
a minimum, some useful role in the structure of US forces. 
Functional control: integrating contractor personnel into the operational team. 
One modest change that could help link policy and reality in the operational theater would be to 
vest functional control and supervision over contractor personnel in commanders subject to the 
theater chain of command. This would formalize the “informal chain of command” relationship 
which apparently already exists in many instances.  
Functional control is the type of control familiar in matrix organizations and among 
personnel seconded from one organization to another. In agency and employment law, this type 
of relationship is recognized in the common law “borrowed servant” doctrine. Examples in civil 
life include a construction crew from one employer (who currently lacks a project to work on) 
being transferred to another employer’s work site and performing work for the second employer. 
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The construction crew may continue to receive its pay from the first employer, who for many 
purposes continues to be the “legal” employer, and take its day-to-day supervision from its 
normal crew boss. The second employer would specify the work to be accomplished and give 
general directions. Typically, the second employer reimburses the first employer for the pay and 
expenses of the “borrowed” employees. Other examples include some types of employment 
agencies which provide temporary workers to manufacturing or retail establishments. The 
agency pays the employee, but the receiving employer exercises functional control.  
The basic concept of separating the legal and functional relationships between 
employers and employees is not foreign to the Federal Government where “work with industry,” 
the Inter-Governmental Personnel Act program, and similar programs have long existed. What 
is being proposed is actually less extreme than any of the examples just mentioned.  
The fact that functional control is vested in a commander in the theater does not mean 
that the commander or his subordinates will be engaging in relatively close or continuous 
supervision of contractor employees. The contractor’s own supervisory structure would still be 
expected to provide day-to-day supervision to contractor employees. The type of functional 
control exercised would be top-level direction and establishing work priorities that impact 
mission accomplishment. 
What is essentially being suggested is modifying the following theoretical chain of 
direction where: (1) the “customer” in the theater communicates its needs and priorities (2) to a 
non-resident contracting officer who validates them and then communicates them (3) to a 
contractor point of contact who then passes them (4) to the contractor personnel who are in 
theater. There are delays inherent in such a chain. Most likely (1) and (4) are in close contact, 
and between them the most accurate communication takes place. In a functional chain of 
direction, (1) would communicate directly to (4) on a real time basis. Information would be 
supplied to (2) and (3) who could provide guidance if local direction varied from contract terms. 
In instances where such was the case, (1) and (4) would be informed accordingly and the 
variance would be corrected, the action ratified, and/or the contract modified to reflect local 
conditions.  
Based on research documented in this paper, what is suggested here does not actually 
change what is taking place; it merely recognizes it as a fact and endorses it as a rational 
approach to the control and management of contractors in deployment situations. It seems quite 
possible to implement this suggestion with appropriate contract language and delegations of 
authority.73 Regulatory changes expressly recognizing the propriety of this type of relationship 
might be necessary, however, to overcome the entrenched views and resistance likely to be 
encountered from contracting officials. 
This recommendation is not intended to create a personal service contract relationship 
between the theater command and the contractor’s personnel within the meaning of FAR 
37.104. Nothing more is intended than to make official the unofficial relationships that are 
currently evident.  
                                                
73 Broad authority to delegate procurement functions is found at 10 USC. 2311. Even if a deviation from 
the FAR or DFARS is deemed necessary to effect this recommendation, that should not inhibit its 
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Temporary militarization of contractor personnel. Given that the definition of “direct 
participation” in combat is evolving and that some of the functions that have been performed by 
contractors, or that may be performed by contractors in the future, could cross the line between 
indirect and direct participation in combat, it is important to find ways to protect the individuals 
involved as well as for the United States to comply with its responsibilities under LOAC. One 
way to do this would be to temporarily grant military status to contractor personnel performing 
functions or in circumstances involving a significant possibility of direct participation in combat. 
One approach would be to establish a new category of military reserve or militia service 
to which certain contractor personnel would be subject as a condition of their contract 
employment. The statute establishing this type of service would limit the number of personnel 
that could actively serve in it but not count them against either the active or reserve strength of 
the Armed Forces serving under standard legal authorities.  
Contractor employees identified for potential activation under this authority would receive 
at least the minimum training in LOAC and other subjects in order to comply with international 
law as well as a basic form of military training. Training would be conducted pursuant to 
government standards. The intent is for activation under this authority not only to be temporary 
but intermittent, that is, military status would be conferred only when there was an actual 
possibility of being directly involved in combat. Personnel would be subject to the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice and other applicable military regulations when in an active status and at other 
times with respect to actions occurring while in an active status or relating to it.  
The uniform worn and standards of appearance for these personnel should be 
essentially the same as for other military personnel. They would have some form of distinctive 
insignia. They should have a distinctive rank titled “Technician” or some similar term, as well as 
a class of rank applicable for protocol but not command purposes (except with respect to others 
in a similar status). They should be exempted from Federal statutes incompatible with the 
temporary and intermittent nature of their service or incompatible with their on-going relationship 
with their private employer. They would be issued military identification cards and afforded 
access to military health and welfare programs while in an active status. Their military status 
would end with their death or disability, which would be handled under the terms of their civilian 
employment relationship.  
Their pay and allowances would be a continuation of their employer’s pay plan or a 
system could be devised similar to the UK Sponsored Reserve where compensation expenses 
upon activation could be paid by the employer, the Government, or, some combination. Simply 
continuing the employer’s pay plan would probably be the simplest approach in most cases. 
Critique of the recommendations. The version of this paper presented at the Naval 
Post Graduate School Acquisition Research Conference is very much presented in order to 
generate discussion and critique of the ideas presented. Comments on the recommendations as 
well as other aspects of the paper are solicited. 
One criticism that might easily be made, for example, is that introducing three different 
types of changes (or at least two types of changes relating to new classes of military personnel) 
is just going too far and too confusing, irrespective of the merits of any individual 
recommendation. Alternatively, one might argue that the case has been made for much more 
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Finally, it is recognized that the devil is often in the detail. Comments and criticism 
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